This paper examines the distributional effects of international outsourcing in a two-sector, two-factor model. The analysis allows for switches between diversified and specialized equilibria. Also, equilibria in which only some firms of a sector outsource (incomplete or partial outsourcing) are considered. It is the interplay of the cost-saving and substitution effects of international outsourcing that determines the nature of the outsourcing equilibrium and its distributional consequences. 
Introduction
After trade and skill-biased technological change, fragmentation and outsourcing have been put forward as explanations for the rising wage differential between skilled and unskilled labor (cf. Hanson, 1996a, 1996b; Slaughter, 2000) . 1 Moving the production of intermediate inputs intensive in the relatively scarce factor of the economy to a foreign country, depresses demand for the scarce factor in the source country. This conclusion has been challenged by Arndt (1997) . The intuitively appealing idea, that in an industrialized, capital-rich country labor is set free if firms have access to cheap foreign labor, may be misleading in the general equilibrium for the following reason.
The mere fact that firms have access to cheap labor makes them relatively more competitive so that they expand production. According to the analysis of Arndt, the positive employment effect resulting from the expansion of production outweighs the negative effect of substituting home labor with foreign labor. This leads to the somewhat surprising conclusion that outsourcing is beneficial for (unskilled) home labor, not harmful and points to the sector bias of international outsourcing. (See also Arndt, 1998; and Egger and Egger, 2001.) In the literature the discussion on whether it is the factor bias (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a , 1996b , 1999 or the sector bias (Arndt, 1997 (Arndt, , 1998a which matters for relative factor rewards is well-known from the debate of Leamer (1998) and Krugman (2000) on how technological change matters for wages. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) It is the purpose of this study to present a systematic analysis of the impact of outsourcing on factor returns in the general equilibrium of an open economy. For a comprehensive picture, it is important to include the possibility of specialization in addition to diversification equilibria. Moreover, one has to account for the fact that also within one and the same sector we may observe 1 The empirical findings in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) "... support the idea that both foreign outsourcing and expenditures on computers have played a role in the increase of the relative wage for nonproduction workers, ..." (p. 938) 2 Xu (2001) analyzes the factor price effects of technical progress by distinguishing between factor-augmenting bias, factor-using bias and sector bias. 3 Krugman (2000) points out, that under certain conditions the results of technological change for a closed economy are similar to the results found for a one-sector small open economy.
outsourcing firms and non-outsourcing firms at the same time. The results are based on the general insight of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that in a diversification equilibrium factor prices are determined by goods prices and technologies alone, whereas a change in factor endowments is irrelevant. Therefore, in an economy in which goods prices are given by the world market, outsourcing can only affect the distribution of factor incomes insofar as the technology of production is changed by the outsourcing firms. Of course, things change in the case of specialization equilibria.
In this case, factor endowments have a crucial role for the determination of factor prices. In particular, if international outsourcing affects the number of active sectors, the distributional effects of international outsourcing are more subtle. Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) argue that "... the standard Heckscher-Ohlin logic applies to small changes in technology, whereas the process of fragmentation is definitely not a marginal phenomenon." (p. 28) Or to state it in words of Jones (2000) "The reason that standard Heckscher-Ohlin logic fails is that such logic is appropriate for relative small changes, those that do not induce a change in the production pattern." (p. 129) Our analysis of international outsourcing considers such large changes. In a two-sector model, a change in the pattern of production arises if the economy switches from diversified to specialized equilibria or vice versa after firms have got access to international outsourcing. 4 We provide a systematic analysis of such switches and their impacts on factor prices.
In Section 2 we show first, that for an individual firm access to international outsourcing is formally equivalent to a choice between production techniques. However, in contrast to mere technical progress which makes new techniques profitable at given factor prices, international outsourcing involves also a change in the set of relevant factor prices. Therefore, international outsourcing may become attractive as progress in coordination techniques makes fragmentation and outsourced production (be it national or international) more profitable but also when international integration gives to a firm access to cheap foreign production inputs. Based on the dual approach of the 2x2-production model with its diagrammatic representation of unit isocost curves in factor price space, we formally identify the assumptions that allow us to treat international outsourcing as equivalent to technical adoption. 5 This gives us a powerful tool for determining the possible outsourcing equilibria and the distributional effects of international outsourcing in these equilibria, including specialization equilibria as well as equilibria in which only part of the firms within a sector choose the outsourcing option. Section 3 presents the results of this analysis. Compared with other recent studies, 6 our goal is to provide in a 2x2 model a complete picture of the effect of international outsourcing on specialization and diversification in the economy's production structure. By allowing for changes in the production pattern of an economy, we gain deeper insights about how cost-saving and substitution effects interact in determining both the type of outsourcing equilibrium and the distributional consequences of international outsourcing. In Section 4 we discuss our main findings and compare them to the literature. A short conclusion completes the paper.
Two aspects are beyond the scope of this analysis. First, we do not consider the impact of outsourcing on the rest of the world. Therefore we are not able to address the question of international factor price equalization. 7 Second, the focus of this paper lies on vertical outsourcing. 
Cross border outsourcing in a 2x2 production model

Definitions and assumptions
We consider a small open economy endowed with two types of primary inputs K and L used in the production of two sectors i = 1,2. The output of sector i is denoted as i S . All markets are perfectly competitive and primary factors are mobile across sectors but internationally immobile.
Production functions are linearly homogenous and strictly increasing, and the unit isocost curves are strictly convex. Compared to integrated production within a firm outsourced production is based on two requirements. First, it must be technologically possible to split up the production process in several fragments. Second, external transaction costs and market conditions must be such that a firm 5 As Mussa (1979) pointed out, this "diagrammatic technique ... is particularly useful in illustrating the properties of the two sector model which are essentially concerned with prices" (p. 525). Feenstra and Hanson (1999) used the dual approach in their discussion on the impact of technologies on factor prices. See also Jones and Kierzkowski (2001b) on the relation between international outsourcing and technical progress. 6 See Arndt (1997 Arndt ( , 1998a , Egger (2002) , Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) . Kohler (2003) provides a systematic analysis of the general n m × -model, however, without the possibility that the number of active production sectors changes due to outsourcing. 7 The issue of international factor-price equalization is discussed in Deardorff (2001a Deardorff ( , 2001b . 8 For a comparison of trade flows under horizontal and vertical fragmentation, see Venables (1999) .
prefers purchasing fragments from outside the firm to in-house production. The following definitions provide a formal description of these aspects.
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Definition 1 (Fragmentation). Let ( ) , f K L be a production function for commodity S and let
, denote a vector of intermediate production functions. Then, x is said to be a fragmentation of integrated production, f , if there exists a "complementing" technology
Technology g may contain production processes, final assembly or simply consist of organizational and managerial activities necessary for coordinating fragmentation. Changes from integrated to fragmented production are not bound to international outsourcing. They generally play an important role in the discussion about organizational and technological change fostered by progress in information processing, logistics and management techniques.
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Whereas fragmentation means the splitting up of a production process independent of whether this occurs in-house or implies input purchases from outside the firm, outsourcing is characterized by a separation of production and involves market transactions.
11 In sum, outsourcing requires a fragmentation of the production process but not vice versa.
Definition 2 (Outsourcing). Let x be a fragmentation of f with complementing technology g .
Then, outsourcing by a firm of intermediate
means that the firm employs g instead of 9 In the literature, the phenomenon of outsourcing has been labeled in various way: "slicing up the value chain" (Krugman, 1995) , "disintegration of production" (Feenstra, 1998) , "multi-stage production" (Dixit and Grossman, 1982) , "intra-product (or super-) specialization" (Arndt, 1998b) . In recent years, the terms "fragmentation" (Deardorff 2001a (Deardorff , 2001b Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001a) and "outsourcing", (Feenstra, 1998; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a; Kohler, 2001; Grossman and Helpman, 2002a ) have become common. For an overview, see Hummels et al. (2001) . 10 For a discussion on ( ) g ⋅ in an international context see Kohler (2001) . 11 The interaction between separated production units could also be handled by contractual arrangements within multinational enterprises (see Markusen, 2002) . In contrast to this, the notion of outsourcing refers to intermediate goods trade. For a distinction between outsourcing and intra-firm transactions of multinational enterprises see also Grossman and Helpman (2002b 
and g refer to factor use in integrated and fragmented modes of production, respectively. The asterisk indicates levels of foreign factor inputs. 13 Foreign factor prices are taken as given.
Our analysis is based on the dual approach of the 2x2-production model. Therefore, we have to specify the unit-isocost curves for integrated and outsourcing production technologies. Denote by
c w w the minimum unit cost of production in sector i without international outsourcing.
Cost minimization under outsourcing implies the minimum-cost combination of i x and homesupplied factor inputs K, L. For production technology g and given unit costs
a w w c be the minimum-cost input coefficients of 12 See Arndt (1997 Arndt ( , 1998a , Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) for a similar approach. 13 Note that neither technologies nor factor prices must be identical in the two countries. 
Definition 3.
International outsourcing is cost-saving at domestic factor prices
c w w c w w c > x or if factor prices are lower abroad, due to endowment differences. It is worth noting that if factor price differences are large enough, and trade costs are low, the outsourcing technology (including the outsourced intermediate process) may at given factor prices be strictly more resource-demanding than the integrated production technology. This has been first noted by Deardorff (2001a) and highlights the main difference to resource-saving technical progress. With respect to the dynamics of international outsourcing, Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) point out that, besides declining tariffs and legal non-tariff barriers, declining costs for service links, which are required for coordination and communication activities, may explain why exploitation of lower foreign factor prices by outsourcing became accessible in recent years. Formally, such changes in transaction costs are reflected by a lower
The following definition characterizes the type of international outsourcing with respect to its factor-intensity impact.
w w be a pair of factor prices fulfilling
c w w c p = . We say that there is labor-outsourcing (capital-outsourcing) at
We also say that outsourcing substitutes labor (capital) and conserves capital (labor, respectively).
It is assumed that over the relevant range of factor prices the production techniques can be ranked according to factor intensities. Factor-intensity reversals are not considered. (A formal discussion of this assumption is provided in the appendix.)
Equilibria
Equilibria without and with international outsourcing (referred to as non-outsourcing and outsourcing equilibria, respectively) are determined by factor endowments, production technologies and by given world market prices. In and C describe specialized equilibria with factor endowments
, respectively.
( Fig. 1 about here) To identify the type of equilibrium resulting when firms get access to cost-saving outsourcing, it is important to note that three technologies are relevant, namely, the two integrated production modes and one outsourcing technology. Let
w w c w w c p Ψ ≡ ≥
. The set of factor prices which is consistent with non-positive profits is then determined by 
saving and the outsourcing equilibrium is diversified.
Distributional effects of international outsourcing
In this section we give a systematic exposition of the distributional effects of international outsourcing for all possible equilibrium situations. We use the diversification/specialization dichotomy as an organizing principle for the exposition. For a given (diversified or specialized) nonoutsourcing equilibrium, the type of outsourcing equilibrium depends on cost-saving and substitution effects of international outsourcing. Graphically (Fig. 2) , the first effect corresponds to the outward shift of the c . In order to make it easier to keep track of the various diversification and specialization equilibria, we enumerate in Table 1 all possible combinations of non-outsourcing and outsourcing equilibria when the K-intensive sector has access to cost-saving international outsourcing. 15 The assumption that production technologies can be ranked according to factor intensities implies that neither describe the outsourcing equilibrium.
( Table 1 about here)
A diversified outsourcing equilibrium
We start our analysis with the standard H-O set-up of diversified equilibria. This case is represented in Fig. 2 under the assumption that there is labor-outsourcing in the K-intensive sector.
We see the established result that if both non-outsourcing and outsourcing equilibria are diversified, then the real return to the factor used intensively in the outsourcing sector increases whereas the real return to the other factor decreases.
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The result follows from the properties of frontier . 16 This corresponds to case DD in Table 1 . 17 See Arndt (1997 Arndt ( , 1998a For a graphical proof 20 , Fig. 3 shows a situation where firms in the K-intensive sector i have access to cost-saving international outsourcing. A diversified outsourcing equilibrium must lie on frontier f ψ south-east of intersection point A. We must distinguish between two cases. First, if the Kintensive outsourcing sector is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium (like in point B), it is clear that factor K gains, whereas factor L loses, since the diversified outsourcing equilibrium lies to the south-east of A and thus south-east of B. Moreover, capital-outsourcing cannot lead to a diversified outsourcing equilibrium, since both isocost curves would be flatter than k ′ at possible candidates for a diversified equilibrium. In sum, if the non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized in the outsourcing sector i, the factor bias determines whether a diversified outsourcing equilibrium is possible.
However, if there is a diversified outsourcing equilibrium, then it is the sector bias of international outsourcing, which determines the factor price developments.
18 See the discussion in Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) on the importance of outsourcinginduced changes in production pattern. 19 Part (a) of Theorem 2 shows that case KD in Table 1 is only possible if there is L-outsourcing. Part (b) deals with this case as well as with LD. 20 Full-length formal proofs can be found in the working paper version available from the authors.
( Fig. 3 about here) Second, if the outsourcing sector i is inactive in the non-outsourcing equilibrium (like in point C), then factor price reactions are ambiguous if there is capital-outsourcing in capital-intensive-sector sector i. In Fig. 3 points A′ and A′′ refer to two possible factor price outcomes. 21 An equilibrium like A′ results if access to cost-saving international outsourcing does not affect the ranking of sectors according to their factor intensities, and it is again the sector bias which determines the factor-price effects of international outsourcing. If the economy moves from non-outsourcing equilibrium C to outsourcing equilibrium A′, factor K, which is used intensively in outsourcing sector i, gains and L loses.
Different factor-price effects result in an outsourcing equilibrium like A′′ . Such an equilibrium is possible if the substitution effect of outsourcing is strong enough so that it leads to a change in the factor intensity ranking of sectors, i. Since a change in the ranking of sectors cannot arise, it is again the sector bias which determines factor price outcomes.
These findings are summarized in Table 2 for outsourcing in the K-intensive sector. In this matrix, "+" and "-" mean that international outsourcing has a positive or negative impact on the respective real or relative factor price. A "amb." indicates that the impact is ambiguous. 21 Note that point C is also a candidate for a diversified outsourcing equilibrium, namely if the two loci ( Table 2 about here)
A specialized outsourcing equilibrium
This section focuses on specialized outsourcing equilibria. In the specialized outsourcing equilibrium factor prices may be such that both the integrated technology and the outsourcing technology are consistent with zero profits. Firms switch from integrated production to outsourcing as long as the adoption of the outsourcing technology is profitable under given factor prices. When many firms switch, the factor prices change and may settle at values at which firms are indifferent between integrated production and outsourcing. We distinguish three cases: (i) In the non-outsourcing equilibrium as well as in the outsourcing equilibrium the country is specialized in the outsourcing sector.
(ii) Cost-saving access to international outsourcing in sector i leads from a diversified nonoutsourcing equilibrium to specialization in the outsourcing sector. (iii) Specialization occurs in the non-outsourcing sector in the non-outsourcing equilibrium, and shifts to the other sector in the outsourcing equilibrium. In (ii) and (iii) international outsourcing again fundamentally changes the production pattern in the economy. Theorem 2 states the distributional effects of cost-saving international outsourcing in sector i for case (i), i.e. if the production pattern is not altered.
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Theorem 2 If the country is specialized in production in outsourcing sector i in both the nonoutsourcing and the outsourcing equilibrium, then the following holds. (a) If outsourcing conserves the factor which is intensively used in outsourcing sector i, then the real return to that factor increases. The real return to the other factor declines if both the integrated (f) and the outsourcing (g) technology are in use. The impact on the real return to this factor is ambiguous if only outsourcing technology g survives. (b) If outsourcing substitutes the factor intensively used in outsourcing sector i, then the real return to this factor decreases if both the integrated (f) and the outsourcing (g) technology are in use in sector i. The impact on the real return to this factor is ambiguous if only the outsourcing technology
survives. The real return to the other factor always increases. Point B represents a non-outsourcing equilibrium specialized in production in the K-intensive 22 Theorem 2 corresponds to case KK in Table 1. outsourcing sector i. Since the equilibrium is specialized, factor intensity at B is equal to k′ . Both technologies f and g can be in use only if the outsourcing equilibrium is at the intersection of the given by intersection point ' A , the return to factor K declines. In contrast, if only outsourcing technology g is in use in the outsourcing equilibrium, the impact on the return to factor K is ambiguous.
( Fig. 5 about here) In sum, we find that access to international outsourcing exhibits a factor-biased effect on factor returns, if the country is specialized in the outsourcing sector in both the non-outsourcing as well as the outsourcing equilibrium. This result coincides with the findings for factor-biased technological change in one-sector models.
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Theorem 3 characterizes the distributional effects for the remaining two cases, namely, case (ii), in which access to international outsourcing leads to a reduction in the number of active sectors, and case (iii) with non-outsourcing sector i − active in the specialized non-outsourcing equilibrium.
Note that the following theorem covers case (ii) as well as case (iii), since in both cases the nonoutsourcing sector i − is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium. 24 In a simple example, Krugman (2000) has shown that the factor bias of technical change identified in a onesector model can be reproduced in a large-country two-sector model. This is in contrast to the findings for small open economies, where technical change exhibits a sector-biased effect on factor prices, see Leamer (2000) . 25 Theorem 3 corresponds to cases DK and LK in Table 1 . 26 If the integrated technology is in use in the outsourcing equilibrium, substitution of factor L tends to work against complete specialization. Specialization therefore requires that the cost-saving effect of international outsourcing is "sufficiently large" so that non-outsourcing sector i − vanishes.
The ambiguity arising under (b) can be seen in Fig. 5 . Again, since the non-outsourcing sector i − is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium, we start at point A or C, respectively. Then, in the case of capital-outsourcing the relevant Suppose, for example, that the non-outsourcing equilibrium is diversified and therefore given by point A in Fig. 5 . Then, the real return to factor K increases if and only if the outsourcing equilibrium lies to the right of ' E . The real return to factor L increases if and only if the outsourcing equilibrium lies above E′′ . Due to the cost-saving effect of international outsourcing, at least one factor gains if the non-outsourcing equilibrium is diversified. 27 The ambiguity in relative factor price developments arises, since there is no clear dominance of the two relevant effects, namely the rotation (factor bias) and the shift (sector bias) of the relevant unit isocost curve of outsourcing sector i. Table 3 provides a complete listing of real and relative factor price effects if the outsourcing equilibrium is specialized. As in Table 2 , outsourcing is assumed to occur in the K-intensive sector.
Regarding the possible non-outsourcing equilibria, we have two cases, namely one where the Lintensive (non-outsourcing) sector is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium and one where it is not. The first case corresponds to Theorem 3, the second case to Theorem 2.
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( Table 3 about here) 27 If the non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on the non-outsourcing sector i − and if the two loci This is different from Table 2 , where the inactivity/activity dichotomy refers to the K-intensive outsourcing sector.
International outsourcing and the Pareto-criterion
Concerning the welfare effects of international outsourcing, the impacts on factor prices derived above directly lead to the following assessment. (See the second and the fourth row of Table 3 .) In particular, a Pareto-improving factor price effect of international outsourcing in sector i arises if the cost-saving and substitution effects of outsourcing are such that the outsourcing equilibrium lies within interval E E ′ ′′ on frontier g ψ , like point E.
Discussion
In the discussion of the distributional effects of international outsourcing, the literature distinguishes between factor-biased and sector-biased impacts of international outsourcing (Kohler, 2001) . Whereas the former is analyzed within one-sector models (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996b) , the analysis in a two-sector framework shows that the factor-bias of international outsourcing, i.e. the factor intensity of the outsourced intermediate input, is of no interest as long as diversified equilibria are considered. Rather, the relevant question is in which sector outsourcing occurs (Arndt, 1997 (Arndt, , 1998a . As shown in Section 3, this result holds only if both the non-outsourcing as well as the outsourcing equilibrium are diversified. However, since the type of outsourcing equilibrium itself depends on the interplay of substitution and cost-saving effects of international outsourcing, a restriction on diversified equilibria implies a restriction on the possible forms of international outsourcing. As Theorems 1-3 make clear, the distinction between sector and factor bias alone is not sufficient to give a comprehensive picture of the distributional effects of international outsourcing.
Section 3 addresses distributional issues even if international outsourcing is not complete. If cost-saving international outsourcing becomes available in one sector, it may nonetheless pay for some firms in this sector to retain the integrated mode of production in the outsourcing equilibrium.
Thus, the integrated technology may co-exist with the outsourcing technology. This is especially relevant with respect to real-world considerations. In line with Krugman's (2000) finding for a onesector economy, we show in Table 3 that the factor bias of international outsourcing remains the relevant force in determining factor prices if the integrated production mode survives and co-exist with the outsourcing technology.
International outsourcing may change the pattern of production (see Jones, 2000; and Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001a) . Consider the case of a small open economy completely specialized in the absence of outsourcing. Then, international outsourcing opportunities in the non-viable sector may lead to diversified production in the outsourcing equilibrium. The textile industry, for example, which migrated to developing countries (mainly in Asia), has been reactivated in the industrialized world in the last few years, using fragmentation and international outsourcing opportunities.
Finally, international outsourcing is Pareto-improving only if integrated technologies are totally replaced by outsourcing technologies. With respect to the Pareto criterion, the assumptions of perfect competition and intersectoral mobility are of course crucial for our conclusions. In reality, adjustment costs may cause losers at least in the short run. Moreover, the analysis above does not incorporate any fixed costs of international outsourcing, which may yield a welfare decline in the outsourcing economy (Kohler, 2001) . Finally, the constant price assumption makes our analysis
suitable for small open economies only.
Conclusion
In this paper we identify under which assumptions we can treat international outsourcing like technical progress. This approach and the advantages of the dual representation of the 2x2-production model allow us to distinguish two driving forces, namely, a substitution and a cost-saving effect of international outsourcing. They determine the type of outsourcing equilibrium (relative to the nonoutsourcing equilibrium) and the factor-price consequences of international outsourcing. 
Mussa, M. (1979
Appendix: Factor Intensities
We make the usual assumption that there is no factor intensity reversal under integrated production. Formally, if 
for some linearly homogeneous 
It is sufficient to assume that no factor intensity reversal occurs over a certain range of factor prices. Let
W w w c w w c p ≡ = be the subset of factor prices defined by the zero profit condition in outsourcing sector j . We assume that there is no factor intensity reversal over
Be aware of the difference to technical progress in the Heckscher-Ohlin model where a global ranking of factor intensities is usually assumed. In the case of international outsourcing such a global ranking is in general not possible due to the described change in the set of inputs in the production process.
An immediate implication of our assumption about factor intensity rankings is that T2 If the L-intensive sector is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium, only the outsourcing technology g is in use in a specialized outsourcing equilibrium. T3 Both factors may gain from international outsourcing.
